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China and GATT 
Accession Instead of Resumption 
After a long impasse, negotiations finally resumed, in the fall of 1992, on the 
entry of the People's Republic of China (PRC) into the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT).' The GATT Working Party on China, authorized by the GATT 
Council to expedite its work, is expected to enter soon into the final stage of the 
negotiations. Apart from unsettled substantive issues relating to market access in 
China, a centraI legal issue that remains to be resolved is the issue of "resumption" v. 
"accession". 
In pursuing its GATT membership, the PRC government has insisted on its 
resumption of  China's original GATT contracting party status, instead of accession as 
a new member. Resumption instead of accession is one of three basic principles that 
the Chinese government set out for its entry into GATT. The other two principles 
are: (1) joining GATT as a developing country; and (2) no special discriminatory 
provisions attached in the China protocol.2 The PRC government felt compelled, 
legally as well as politically, to take this position in order to denounce the validity of 
China's withdrawal from GATT in 1950 by the former Chinese government, 
currently the government in Taiwan. It has been understood between China and 
GATT, however, that the resumption would serve as a legal formality only: the PRC 
would not inherit any rights and obligations from China's original contracting party 
* Attorney at law, New York, U.S.A. LL.B. Beijing University; LL.M. and S.J.D. Harvard University. 
This article is based on Chapter 5 of the author's doctoral dissertation China and GATT: Toward a ~ W e a n i n ~ ~ u l  
Participation? completed at Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass., U.S.A., in May 1990. The author wishes to 
thank Professors Detlev Vagts and William Alford of Harvard Law School for their advice and support in 
supervising the dissertation and Mr Ake LindCn, and through him many other members of the GATT Secretariat, 
whose help made the completion of the dissertation research possible. The views expressed herein are solely those 
of the author. 
' The PRC government requested resumption of China's contracting party status in GATT on 10 July 1986. 
GATT DOC. Ll6017 (14 July 1986). The GATT Working Party on China suspended its meetings after the Tiananmen 
Square crackdown in June 1989. Subsequently, the negotiations were further stalled by the PRC's hardline position 
on Taiwan's GATT application, which was submitted inJanuary 1990. A compromise was eventually reached in the 
fall of 1992 and, in connection with establishing a working party on Taiwan's accession to GATT, the GATT Council 
authorized the Working Party on China to expedite its work and report to the Council as soon as possible. 
Statement by Council Chairman on Accession of Chinese Taipei at GATT Council of Representatives Meeting, 29 
Septyber  1992, Statement to GATT Council on Taiwan, Inside U.S. Trade, Special Report, 2 October 1992, at S 4 .  
- See Statement by Shen Jueren, Deputy Minister of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, Head of the 
Chinese Delegation at the Third Session of the GATT Working Party on China, Geneva, 26 April 1988. 
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status, and all substantive terms of China's GATT membership would be subject to 
negotiation. Thus far, the negotiation on China's membership has been conducted in 
the typical manner of accession, i.e. a working party is set up to examine the 
economic and trade regime of the applicant which is followed by negotiations of a 
tariff schedule and other concessions to be made by the applicant, and the conclusion 
of a protocol embodying all the terms and conditions of the applicant's GATT 
r n e m b e r ~ h i ~ , ~  although it has been suggested that the legal instrument governing 
China's GATT relations should be entitled "protocol of resumption"." 
The "mere" formality of resumption, however, raises significant legal questions 
for GATT and imposes certain legal problems on particular GATT contracting parties. 
Yet, the question of 'resumption' v. 'accession' has not been formally discussed within 
GATT due to the Working Party's decision to postpone the issue until substantive 
terms of China's membership are agreed upon. Although during the last few years a 
number of articles on China and GATT have addressed the issue of resumption,5 these 
articles have gone little beyond expounding the Chinese government's position and 
identifying associated issues, and none of them has questioned the legality of the 
resumption. 
This article presents a different analysis. The author is of the view that the 
resumption position is legally flawed and mistaken as a result of overlooking the 
unique legal structure of GATT. Based on an analysis in international law, it is the 
author's conclusion that the only legally correct way for China to join GATT is through 
accession under Article XXXIII of the General Agreement."ollowing this 
conclusion, recommendations are made as to legally sound and politically beneficial 
methods that the Chinese government may wish to adopt in replacing its resumption 
approach with that of accession. 
China was one of the twenty-three signatories to the Final Act of 30 October 
1947, authenticating the text of the GATT.' The General Agreement, however, has 
' Accession is provided by Article XXXIII of the General Agreement. See infra, footnote 6. 
See Chung-chou Li, Resumption of China's G A T T  Membership, 21 J. W.T.L. 4, at 46, 1987. 
' See Wenguo Cai, China's GATT Membership: Selected Legal and Political Issues, 26 J.W.T. 5, at 35, 1992; Lei 
Wang, Separate Customs Territory in  G A T T ~ ~ ~  Taiwan's Request for G A T T  Membership, 35 J. W.T. 5, at 5, 1991; Yu- 
shu Feng, China's Membership of GATT:  A Practical Proposal, 22J. W.T. 6. at 53, 1988; Li, supra, footnote 4; Robert E. 
Herzstein, China and the GATT:  Legal and Policy Issues Raised by China's Participation in the General Agreement on 
T a r g s  and Trade, 18 Law & Poly Int'l Bus. 371 (1986). 
" Article XXXIII provides that a government not party to the General Agreement, or a government acting on 
behalfofa separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in its external commercial relations, may accede to 
the Agreement, based on negotiation of terms and a two-thirds majority vote. Accession under Article XXXIII is 
one basic way of becoming a contracting party to GATT. Another method ofjoining GATT is succession under 
Article XXVL:S(c) of the General Agreement, which was designed for the former colonial territories to continue 
their participation in GATT without interruption after independence. See generally, John H. Jackson. World Trade 
and the L a w  o f G a r r ,  96-100, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1969. 
' 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 188 (1947). As the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade refers to both the text of the 
treaty and the institution that has developed on the basis ofthe treaty, the convention is to refer to the institution as 
GATT and the treaty as the General Agreement or the Agreement. See K.  Dam, T h e  G A T T :  Law and International 
Economic Organization, 3, no. 1, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1970. 
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never entered into force i t ~ e l f . ~  Instead, it was first brought into application through 
the conclusion of the Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (the PPA) in 1947' and subsequently by a series of protocols of 
accession to GATT."' The twenty-two governments" that signed the PPA became the 
original Contracting Parties of GATT, and China was one of them." 
Not long after itjoined GATT, the government of the Republic of China (ROC) 
was defeated in the civil war and replaced by the government of the PRC, which 
declared its founding on 1 October 1949. Having lost control over mainland China, 
the deposed ROC government relocated in Taiwan and continued to claim status as 
the legitimate government of China. For historical reasons, such claim was supported 
by a majority of the nations at the time and for a long period thereafter. 
O n  6 March 1950, the ROC government notified the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations of its withdrawal from the GATT. '~ Although the validity of the 
* Article XXVI:6 of the General Agreement provides that it shall enter into force after governments 
representing a certain minimum share of world trade have accepted it. Since only one current contracting party, 
Haiti, has accepted the General Agreement (Liberia accepted the General Agreement on 17 May 1950 but withdrew 
on 13 June 1953). it has not yet entered into force. See GATT Analytical Index-Notes on the Drafritr'q, Interpretation 
and Application of  the  Articles of the General Asreement, 1989 ed; Hon (hereafter Analytical Index) ,  Introductionll, 
Article XXVI: 11. O n  several occasions the contracting parties considered the question of acceptance of the 
General Aereement itself. See 3rd SUDD. Basic Insmrments and Selected Documents (hereafter BISD) 48. 1955: GATT , , 
D O C : , L / ' ~ ~ ~  (1965); 26th Sup;. ~ 1 ~ 6 ' 6 1  (1980). 
55 U.N.T.S. 308 (1947). Reprint in 4 BISD 77-78 (1969). To apply GATT through the PPA was a decision 
made under special historical circu~stances. For the purpose ofobtainjig-immediate &iff concessions, GATT was 
negotiated parallel to the Charter of the International Trade Organization (ITO), the comprehensive world trade 
organization envisaged after World War 11. To ensure the value ofthe tariff concessions not to be nullified by non- 
tariff measures, certain provisions of the Draft I T 0  Charter (known as the Havana Charter) were incorporated 
into Part I1 ofthe General Agreement. Somedelegates, however, indicated their lack ofauthority to negotiate these 
provisions. In order to prevent the delay of implementing the tariff concessions already agreed upon, a 
compromise was made to conclude a protocol to limit the application of Part I1 to the extent not inconsistent with 
the existing legislation of the contracting parties ~ n d  to apply the entire General Agreement on a provisional basis 
as it was intended that GATT would eventually become part ofthe [TO. Whereas the negotiation of the I T 0  and the 
Havana Charter eventually aborted, GATT has survived on the basis of the PPA. See Jackson, supra, footnote 6 ,  at 
6142,  (citing U.N. Doc. EPCT1100. 135 (1947); U.N.  Doc. EPCTITAC 1 and 4 (1947)). 
Countries subsequently acceding to GATT each concluded their protocols of accession containing 
provisions similar to the PPA. The practice ofapplying GATT on the basis ofprotocol of provisional application has 
been followed throughout GATT history. 
" According to its provision, the PPA was to be signed by eight governments (Australia. Belgium, C~nada ,  
France, Luxemburg, Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States) by 15 November 1947 and applied 
by them on and after 1 January 1948, and to remain open for signature until 30 June 1948 by the signatories to the 
Final Act. All the government signatories to the Final Act but Chile signed the PPA by the cut-off date. Chile 
became a GATT contracting party afterwards through accession in February 1948. See G.-1~~--Stat1rs of Le,yal 
Itrstrrimcnts. 3-1.1; Jackson, supra, footnote 6. at 91. 
" China deposited its Instrument of Acceptance of the PPA on 21 Aprll 1948 and its application O ~ G A T T  took 
effect on 21 May 1948. See Analytical Index, supra, footnote 8, Contracting Parties-1. 
" GATT/CP/%, Commurricationfrom Secretary-General ofUnited Nations Rgarditr~y Ck ina .  The w~thdrawal took 
effect on 5 May 1950, sixty days after the notice, in accordance with Article 5 of the PPA. The ROC'S quick 
withdrawal from GATT (several months after the founding of the PRC) contrasts with its practice in most of the 
other international organizations where it retained its presence for as long as it was able to. Although the official 
reason of withdrawal was not given, it 1s obvious that, given the nature of GATT obligations, it would be to the 
disadvantage of the ROC government to be continuously held responsible for the customs territory of mainland 
China. over which it had lost control. 
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withdrawal was challenged within GATT at the time,I4 the withdrawal has been 
consistently treated as effective by GATT and its contracting parties.I5 
The ROC government obtained observer status in GATT in 1965,16 but lost such 
status in 1971 after the passing of the U.N. General Assembly Resolution No. 2758 
(XXVI) recognizing the PRC government as the sole legal representative of China to 
the United Nations and "expel[ling] the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the 
place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations 
related to it."" Based on its policy of following decisions of the United Nations on 
essentially political matters, the CONTRACTING PARTIES'~ re-examined its decision of 
1965 and decided that "the Republic of Chlna should no longer have observer status" 
- 
in GATT. This decision was made through consensus, although a number of 
contracting parties expressed their disagreement.I9 
For a period of three decades after its founding, the PRC had virtually no contact 
with GATT." It was only when China inaugurated extensive economic reforms in the 
late 1970s that the PRC government began to show interest in GATT and the initial 
official contact was made in 1980, which resulted in the attendance of a Chinese trade 
official in the GATT commercial policy training course." China then obtained 
" Czechoslovakia challenged the withdrawal on theground that the ROC government lacked the competent 
authority to represent China. Summary Record ofthe Sixth Meeting oftke TartffNegotiations Committee, GATTlTN.21 
SR.6, 13 November 1950. The Czech representative suggested that an inquiry be sent to Peking on their attitude 
towards GATT and proposed to include in the Torquay Protocol, which omitted China from the list ofcontracting 
parties in its Preamble, a note to theeffect that "The Nationalist Government of the Republic ofChina has notified 
its withdrawal from the General Agreement with effect from 5 May 1950; the Central People's Government of 
China has not yet defined its position with regard to the General Agreement." The proposal was rejected by the 
Chairman on the ground that it was unnecessary to mention that point in the Protocol. Id. at 2-3. 
" Subsequent GATT documents have consistently treated China as a withdrawn contracting party. See e.g. 
Analytical Index, Protocol-13, Sec. 5; Contracting Parties-1, no. 2. It was reported that between 1950 and 1962, 
fourteen GATT contracting parties withdrew the concessions they had originally negotiated with China. F. Liser, 
China and the General Agreement on Tarfls and Trade, in Joint Economic Committee, Congress ofThe United States, 
China under the Four Modernizations, Part 11, 138-139, 1982. 
'%ATT/SR.22/3, 16 March 1965. In discussing the granting of observer status to the ROC, a number of 
contracting parties stated that they recognized the PRC as the legitimate government of China. The issue was 
evaded by the announcement of the Chairman of the CONTRACTING PARTIES that admission of observers did not 
prejudice the position of GATT or of individual contracting parties towards recognition of the government in 
question, and that the CONTRACTING PARTIES followed the policy expressed in Article 86 of the Havana Charter, 
namely, to avoid passingjudgment in any way on essentially political matters and to follow decisions of the United 
Nations on such questions. Id. at 2-3. 
I' Resolution on Representation ofChina,  U.N.G.A. Res. 2758,26 GAOR Supp. 29 (A18429). at 2. For history 
of the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations and other U.N. related organizations, see 
Frederick L. Kirgis, International Organizations in their Legal Setting, 123-144, St. Paul, Minnesota, West Publishing 
Co., 1977. 
The contracting parties acting jointly are designated as the CONTRACTING PARTIES by Article XXV: 1 of the 
General Agreement. The contracting parties in small letters means the individual member countries. The form 
Contracting Parties is also used in practice to refer to GATT in general. See Olivier Long, Law and Its Limitation in the 
GATT Multilateral Trade System, 6, no. 15, 1985. 
I" Summary Recordofthe FirstMeeting, G A T T / S R . ~ ~ / ~ ,  19 November 1971, at2.3 and4. For t h e G ~ ~ ~ p o l i c y  of 
following the United Nations decisions on political matters, see sopra, footnote 16. 
31 It was reported that the PRC government expressed its appreciation ofthe GATT decision to terminate the 
ROC'S observer status, but took no action with regard to its status in GATT. See W. Feeney. Chinese Policy in 
Multilateral Financial Institutions, China and World, 285, S. Kim (ed.) 1984. See also Li, supra, footnote 4, at 27. 
" Li, ibid. at 28. 
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observer status for the session of the CONTRACTING PARTIES in 1982,'"nd observer 
status in meetings of the Council of Representatives and its subordinate bodies in 
1984." Since then, China has been attending GATT meetings regularly in that capacity. 
On  10 July 1986, the PRC government formally requested its resumption of China's 
contracting party status in GATT.'.' In connection with this request, China was admitted to 
full participation in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations.'5 In March 
1987, a GATT Working Party on China's Status as a Contracting Party was set up with the 
mandate to "examine the foreign trade regime" of the PRC and to "develop a draft 
Protocol setting out the respective rights and obligations".'' 
In its communication to the Director-General of GATT dated 10 July 1986, the 
PRC government advised that, upon recalling that China was one of the original 
contracting parties to the General Agreement, the PRC government had decided to 
"seek the resumption of its status as a contracing party to GATT" and was prepared "to 
enter into negotiations with GATT contracting parties on the resumption ofits status as 
a contracting party. "" The resumption approach was subsequently elaborated in a 
statement of the Chinese delegation to GATT, which is worth quoting in length: 
"The founding of  the People's Republic of China in 1949 did not alter China's status as a 
subject of  international law. The withdrawal from GATT in 1950 by the deposed regime in 
Taiwan was illegal and invalid. The United Nations, in a Resolution adopted in 1971, decided 
to restore all its rights to the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and in all the 
organizations related to it and recognize the representatives of the government of the People's 
Republic of China as the only legitimate representatives of China. O n  the understanding that 
the GATT follows decisions of the United Nations on essentially political matters, the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES terminated the status ofthe observer from Taiwan. . . Therefore, there 
is a sufficient political and legal basis for China's request for resumption of  its status as a 
contracting party." 
The statement went on explaining the realistic approach of resumption: 
" GATT ClMl160, at 2. 24 September 1982. Mindful of its legal position regarding China's original 
contracting party status, the PRC government carefully stated in its request for GATT observer status that ". . . this 
request is without prejudice to the position ofche government ofthe People's Republic ofChina with regard to its 
legal stacus ois-2-vir the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade." GATT Doc. Ll5344, 5 July 1982. For a brief 
descrytion of observer status in GATT, see Long, supra, footnote 18, ~t 46. 
GATT DOC. L/5712, 26 October 1984; GATT ClMl183, at 4. The Council of Representatives is the inter- 
sessional body of the CONTRACTING PARTIES open to all contracting parties that request its membership. The 
Council has the authority to take up all the questions the CONTRACTING PARTIES deal with at their sessions, as well 
as any urgent matter, and oversees the work of the various subsidiary GATT bodies. See 9th Supp. BISD 8 (1961). 
For an introduction to the organization of the GATT, see LONG, supra, foot not^ 18, at 44-54. 
" GATT DOC. Ll6017, 14 July 1986. 
'j The Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round states that the Uruguay Round 1s open to "countries 
that have already informed the CONTRACTING PARTIES . . . of their intention to negotiate the terms of their 
membership as a contracting party." 33rd Supp. BISD 19 (1987), Part I, F(a)(iv) The provision was said to 
accommodate China's situation in particular. Li, supra, footnote 4, at 39. It was the hope of the PRC government 
that participation in the new round of multilateral trade negotiations would facilitate the process of its entry into 
GAT?. 
- 
" See GATT DOC. Ll619llRev. 2, 26 April 1988. As of the time of this writing, the Working Party's 
examination appears to be nearing conclusion, which is to be followed by tariffnegotiations and drafting ofthe 
protocol. 
" Supra,  footnote 24. 
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"However, having taken into account the contractual nature o f  the  General Agreement, w e  
agree to  enter into substantive negotiations with contracting parries for the resumption of 
China's contracting party status and  set the rights and obligations. In view o f  considerable 
changes having taken place during the suspension o f  relations between China and GATT, m y  
government proposes t o  take a non-retroactive approach to  issues which occurred during the 
period o f  suspension. 
The statement set forth three basic propositions 
(1) that the PRC's resumption of China's status as a GATT contracting party is 
justified under international law and supported by international practice, and 
the PRC has the right to request such resumption; 
(2) that in view of the considerable changes that have taken place during the period 
of suspension and the contractual nature of GATT, the PRC is willing to enter 
into substantive negotiations to set its rights and obligations on the basis of 
contemporary conditions; and 
(3) with respect to issues from the period of China's absence from GATT, a non- 
retroactive approach should apply, i.e. to forget about the past so that potential 
legal issues arising out of old rights and obligations can be avoided. Thus, the 
PRC's position regarding its entry into GATT essentially amounts to resumption 
in form, accession in substance. 
111. THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF "RESUMPTION" 
Substantive rights and obligations aside, however, resumption is a legal 
concept.'9 Its application could arise to a number of legal issues, including the 
applicability of Article XXXV of the General Agreement, the availability of the 
"existing legislation" exemption for China, and potential complications of the legal 
structure of China's GATT applications.30 
2X Statement by Shen Jueren, supra, footnote 2. 
" It is significant that the PRC government carefully chose the word "resumption" in the GATT context, 
whereas "restoration" was used in the context of the United Nations, IMF, World Bank or other related 
organizations where the China seat had been occupied uninterruptedly by the ROC until replaced by thePRC. The 
differentiation in the choice of words suggests the recognition that relations between China and GATT have been 
suspended, while relationship in the other cases was continuous. Note that there is no equivalent distinction 
between "resumption" and "restoration" in Chinese; the term hui fu (meaning to restore, resume. rehabilitate, 
regain) is used in both contexts. 
31 In addition, the resumption issue took on a new dimension of significance when Taiwan requested 
accession to GATT as ' L C ~ s t ~ m s  Territories ofTaiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu" in January 1990. Arguing that 
the PRC government is the sole legitimate government of China and Taiwan is an inseparable part of China, the 
PRC government vigorously opposed Taiwan's request and insisted that Taiwan cannotjoin GATT before the PRC 
government resumes China's original GATT membership. For an elaboration ofthe PRC government's position, 
see Wang, supra, footnote 5. From the PRC's perspective, Taiwan's GATT application is part ofits attempt to regain 
international recognition of its political regime. Consequently, the PRC government may well consider 
resumption all the more important since the very purpose of resumption is to affirm the legitimacy of the PRC 
government at the sole legal government of China. For an analysis ofTaiwan's legal capacity to join GATT under 
ir~ternational aw, see Ya Qin, G ~ r r M e m b e r s h i p  for Taiwan: A n  At~alys is  in International L a w ,  24 N.Y.U.J. Int'l L. & 
Pol. 1059 (1992). 
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A. Applicability of Article X X X V  
Article XXXV of the General Agreement (Non-application of the Agreement 
between Particular Contracting Parties) provides a contracting party with the right 
not to apply the General Agreement with another, if either party does not consent to 
such application and has not entered into tariff negotiations with the other at the time 
either accedes to GATT.~' The right is so provided so that no contracting party would 
be forced to enter into GATT relations with another without its ~onsent .~ '  In GATT 
history, Article XXXV has been commonly used by the contracting parties.33 
Since Article XXXV can only be invoked at the time of accession pursuant to 
article XXXIII, it would not be applicable to China in the case of resumption. As a 
result, unless special arrangements are made, all the contracting parties would be 
required to apply GATT with China regardless of whether or  not they consent to such 
application. The inability to invoke Article XXXV, however, would be particularly 
unfair to those contracting parties which acceded to GATT after China's "withdrawal" 
in 1950 and thus never knowingly entered into GATT relations with China.34 For these 
countries, this would be their first opportunity to consider whether to apply GATT 
with China. Legally speaking, resumption is inapplicable to GATT relations between 
these countries and China, since no such relations ever existed before. 
The inability to invoke Article XXXV against China may also pose problems 
for certain contracting parties, especially the United States. The U.S. domestic 
legislation traditionally imposes restrictions on the extension of most-favoured- 
nation treatment (MFN) to non-market economy countries.35 Because GATT 
mandates extension of MFN unconditionally among its contracting parties, the 
" Article XXXV, para. 1. Note that a contracting party which invokes Article XXXV against another ar the 
time ofthelatter's accession may, however, vote in favour ofsuch accession pursuant to Article XXXIII. Analytical 
Index, supra, footnote 7, Article XXXW6, Sec. 8. Invocation ofArticle XXXV can be subsequently withdrawan; 
and once withdrawn, it cannot be restored. For discussion of Article XXXV and its origin and application in GATT 
histo,y, see Jackson, supra, footnote 6, at 98-102; Analytical Index, ibid., Article XXXWl. 
Historically, Article XXXV was drafted to accommodate the change of voting requirement under Article 
XXXIII from unanimity to a two-thirds majority, which raised the possibility that a contracting party could be 
forced to enter into GATT relations with another country without its consent. See Jackson, supra, footnote 6, at 92; 
Analytical Itrdex, ibid., Article XXXV. Article XXXV does not apply in the case of succession under Article 
XXVI:5(c), see supra, foomote 6, since tariff negotiations are not required thereunder. A succeeding contracting 
party may inherit the invocation of Article XXXV from its sponsor. See Atralytical Index, ibid., Article XXXV:3. 
" For the list of all invocations in GATT history and their current status, see Analytical Index, ibid., Article 
X X X W H ,  Secs. 6 and 7. The most extensive use ofthe article in GATT history was with respect to Japan, which 
acceded to GATT in 1955, although most ofthese invocations were eventually withdrawn. A large number ofnew 
contracting parties which acceded to GATT through sponsorship under Article XXVI:5(c) succeeded the 
invocation of Article XXXV against Japan from the contracting parties formerly responsible for their customs 
territories. See M. Bronckers, A Legal Analysis of Protectionist Measures Affectitrg Japanese Imports itr the European 
Community-Revisited, Protectionism and the European Community, 60, E. Volker (ed.), 1987. The extensive use 
of Article XXXV againstJapan caused the CONTRACTING PARTIES to conduct several studies of the situation. See 10 
Supp; BISD 69 (1962). 
China's withdrawal from GATT has been consistently treated as effective. See supra, footnote 15. However, 
this analysis does not apply to those contracting parties which were former colonies of the original contracting 
parties (PPA signatories) and succeeded to GATT pursuant to Article XXVI:5(c). See supra, footnotes 32 and 33. 
'j Currently, under the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, the U.S. government may not extend MFN treatment to a 
non-market economy country unless such country permits free emigration. A waiver for this restriction may be 
granted by the President if he determines that progress has been made in such country towards the goal of free 
emigration; the President's waiver authority is subject to various checks by the United States. 
84 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE 
United States has, in the past, resorted to invocation of Article XXXV. to avoid 
entering GATT relations with certain non-market economy countries.36 Since China is 
considered a non-market economy, the United States may also decide to refrain from 
entering into GATT relations with China.37 However, it would not be able to do so by 
utilizing article XXXV if China were to resume its original contracting party status. 
Negotiation of an ad hoc exception would be necessary in the case of resumption. 
B. The "Existing Legislation" Exemption 
Another issue raised by resumption concerns the availability of  the "existing 
legislation" exemption for China. The existing legislation clause, also known as the 
grandfather clause, is provided in the PPA and every protocol of accession. It permits 
each contracting party to apply Part I1 of the General Agreement, which covers 
mostly restrictions on the use of non-tariff barriers, only "to the extent not 
inconsistent with existing legislation" at the time of its entry into GATT.~' Should 
China join GATT through accession, it would be entitled to the exemption of its 
inconsistent legislation existing as of the date of its accession. Such exemption, 
however, would not be available to China should it "resume" its original 
membership, since the applicable date of existing legislation for the original 
contracting parties is 30 October 1947, the date of the PPA39 and any Chinese 
legislation existing on that date has long since been abolished by the PRC 
government."" Realizing that this was the case, the Chinese delegation requested that 
the applicable date for its existing legislation exemption be the date of its resumption 
instead ofthe date of the PPA." Obviously, this position is inconsistent with the logic 
Y' The United States invoked Article XXXV against Romania and Hungary despite its support for their 
accession to GATT. See e.g. Working Party Report on Accession of Romania, adopted on 6 October 1971, 18 Supp. 
BISD 94 (1972). The United States did not invoke Article XXXV against Yugoslavia or Poland at the time of their 
respective accessions to GATT based on its judgment that these two countries were not under Soviet control. 
Historically, as a result of the enactment ofsuch restrictivelegislationin the early 1950s. the United States ceased to 
apply GATT to Czechoslovakia, an original GATT contracting party, which led to a GATT decision granting the 
suspension O ~ G A T T  relations between the two countries. See 2 BISD 36 (1952). For a briefaccount ofthe history of 
U.S. legislation with respect to non-market economy countries, see John H. Jackson, T h e  World Trading System, 
Law and Policy oflnternational Economic Relations, 292-295, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press, 1989. See 
also K. Grzybowski. East- West Trade Relations in the United States: T h e  1974 U . S .  Trade Act, Title IV, 11 J.W.T.L., 
December 1977. 
" Since the U.S.-China bilateral trade agreement first came into effect China has been receiving MFN 
treatment from the United States under the waiver authority ofthe U.S. President, and its MFN status is subject to 
annual renewal by the President and approval of the U.S. Congress under the Trade Act of 1974. Agreemettt on 
Trade Relations Between the United States and the People's Republic of Chitla. 7 July 1979 (effective 1 February 1980), 31 
U.S.T. 4652 and supra, footnote 35. 
31 
39 
See supra, Section I. 
Since PPAs provided different dates for their entering into force with respect to different contracting 
parties, a GATT ruling was made that PPA "refers to legislation existing on 30 October 1947, the date of the 
Protocol as written at the end ofits last paragraph." Date ofRPfereene for tile Plrrase "Existitly Legislatiotl" in Paragraph 
I ( b )  $the Protocol: Ruling by the Chairman on 11 August 1949, 2 BISD 35 (1952). 
In contrast, the PRC government did not abrogate all the treaties its preceding governments had 
concluded. Instead, it adopted an analytical approach towards the existing treaty obligations. See text infra at 
footnote 57. 
'' The Chinese delegation stated at the meeting ofthe Working Party on China that "upon the resumption of 
its membership, China would apply Part I1 of the General Agreement to the fullest extent not inconsistent with 
domestic legislation existing at the time of resumption." GATT Doc. Spec (88) 13/Add.5, at 2. 
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of its proposed resumption of China's original contracting party status. The 
significance of this issue, however, is diminished in practice since the PRC hardly ever 
imposes its non-tariff barriers in the form of legislation of "mandatory character" as 
strictly interpreted by the GATT rules.42 
C.  Complication of the GATT Legal Structure 
The proposed resumption would cause further complications to the already 
complex legal structure of GATT, thanks to the significant development of GATT in the 
last four decades. During China's absence from GATT, the General Agreement has 
been amended numerous times and a new part (Part IV) regarding developing 
countries has been added to the Agreement." If China were to resume its original 
membership, its legal status with respect to each of the subsequent amendments 
would require clarification. Moreover, during the years of China's absence, the 
number of GATT contracting parties has increased from the original twenty-two to 
over one hundred. Whereas China may seek resumption ofits GATT application with 
other original contracting parties (and probably those which succeeded to GATT under 
the sponsorship of  the original contracting parties44), it cannot possibly "resume" 
GATT applications with those contracting parties which acceded to GATT during 
China's absence and have never before applied GATT with China. In order to establish 
GATT relations between China and these countries, separate agreements (from the 
agreement of "resumption") would have to be concluded between them."5 The criss- 
cross GATT relations China may have with respect to different contracting parties and 
different GATT legal instruments could result in overwhelming legal and technical 
complications for the GATT system. 
IV. THE FALLACY OF THE RESUMPTION APPROACH 
The PRC government is correct in arguing that the withdrawal from GATT by a 
deposed Chinese government is invalid under international law. According to 
generally accepted principles ofinternational law, the essential criterion in recognition 
of a government that came into power through force is whether that government has 
established effective control over most of the territory of the State and if such control 
" See Analytical Index, supra, footnote 8, Protocol-5-8, Sec. 4(b); Panel Report on Norway-Restrictiotrs otr 
Imports ojApples and Pears,adopted on 22 June 1989, GATT Doc. Ll6474, 36 Supp. BISD 306, 321 (1990). 
'' For status of amendments to the General Agreement, see GATT Status ojLrga1 Irrsfrrrments-2. See also 
Anal tical Index, ibid., Article XXX. 
' In accordance with Article 2 of the PPA, the General Agreement is also applied to the territories of the 
original contracting parties. Subsequently, most of these territories became independent and succeeded to GATT 
under the sponsorship of the original GATT members pursuant. to Article XXVI:S(c). Since the succeeding 
contracting parties inherit application of GATT from their sponsors, China's resumption claim should apply to 
them as well as to their sponsors. See Analytical hdex, supra, footnote 8, Article XXVI: 6-7 for a list ofsucceeding 
contracting parties. See also, Jackson, supra, footnote 6, at 96-100; Tatsuro Kunugi, Sfate Succession in the 
Framework ~ ~ G A T T ,  59 Am. J. Int'l L. 268 (1965). 
'j The same problem would also arise in the context of Article XXXV. See supra, text at footnote 34. 
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is likely to contin~e. '~ Recognition of a new government is retroactively .effective 
from the time the government was established." Inasmuch as GATT followed the 1971 
U.N. General Assembly Resolution on China and terminated the ROC's observer 
status, GATT has recognized the PRC as the legal representative of china,* and such 
recognition should be retroactively effective from the date of the founding of the PRC 
government on 1 October 1949. Consequently, the ROC's withdrawal from GATT in 
1950, subsequent to the founding of the PRC, can only be null and void as a matter of 
international law. 
A. A Question in the Law of Treaties 
The PRC government's resumption approach, however, is mistaken for reasons 
other than the validity of ROC's withdrawal. The legal issue in the GATT context is 
not whether the ROC's withdrawal ever validly terminated China's contracting party 
status. As far as GATT is concerned, the question of Chinese government 
representation has been settled since 1971. Thus, unlike the case in the United Nations 
and various other international organizations, the issue of China's membership in 
GATT does not lie in government representation.49 Rather, the question goes to the 
continuing validity of China's original membership itself: after non-application of 
GATT for more than four decades during which substantial changes have taken place, 
is China's original contracting party status in GATT still valid? 
This question is essentially a question in the Law of Treaties. The GATT is first and 
foremost an inter-governmental agreement.50 As a treaty, the General Agreement 
provides the rights and obligations of its contracting parties and serves as the 
constituent instrument of the GATT organization. The continuation ofa government's 
46 For general theory and State practice regarding the prerequisites and legal effects of recognition of 
government in international law, see 2 Whiteman Diyest of International Law,  Sec. 4 Prerequisites; Secs. 61-65 
Recognition of Governments; Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition in Ititernational Law,  Part I1 (1947); Ti-Chiang Chen, 
T h e  International L a w  of Recognition, Part 11 (1951). For discussion on recognition of the PRC government in 
international law, see Chen Tiqiang, T h e  People's Republicof Chitia and Problem of Recognition, 1985 Chin. Y. B. tnt'l 
L. 3. See also, Legal Implications of Recognition of the People's Republic o fChina ,  72 Proc. Am. Soc'y Int'l L. 240 
(1978). 
' 43 See 2 Whiteman, supra, footnote 46, Sec. 70 Effect $Recognition, at 728-738. 
" It should be noted that the question of government representation in an international organization is 
distinct from the question ofrecognition ofa government by individual members of that organization. It has long 
been accepted that recognition of a State or government is an individual act subject to the national policy of each 
member, whereas admission to membership or acceptance of representation in an international organization is a 
collective act of the organization subject to the Charter and Rules of the organization. The acceptance of 
representation, thereforeis not conditioned on recognition by individual members. See Kirgis, supra, footnote 17. 
124-127, citing Legal Aspects of Problems of Representation iri the United Nations. Memorandum by the Secretary- 
Gen;;al ofthe United Nations, U.N. Doc. Sl1466 (1950). 
From a legal standpoint, one could also argue that the issue of government representation does not exist in 
GATT because GATT members are governments acting on behalf ofseparate autonomous customs territories, not 
representatives of sovereign States. See definition of "contracting party" in Articles XXXII and XXXIII of the 
General Agreement and the PPA (which specifically refers to "governments" in each of its six Articles). This is in 
contrast with other major international organizations, e.g. the United Nations, whose members are defined as 
"States". U.N. Charter, Article 4, para. I. See Qin, supra, footnote30, at 1074-5. 
34  Because GATT was originally intended to be a temporary trade agreement only and most ofits institutional 
framework has been developed gradually over the years, after I T 0  failed, seesupra, Section I, GATT retains a salient 
contractual character, distinguishing it from other international organizations. For discussion of the legal nature of 
GATT, see Jackson, supra, footnote 6, at 119; Long, supra, footnote 18, at 44. 
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membership in GATT is therefore contingent upon the continuation of its being a 
contracting party to the General Agreement-the underlying treaty of the GATT 
organization. Thus, the current legalstatus ofchinain GATT can only be determined by 
defining the current status of China with respect to the General Agreement. 
B.  Suspension or Termination? 
The PRC's request for resuming China's original contracting party status is 
based on the assumption that, absent any valid withdrawal from GATT, China is 
technically still a contracting party to GATT. This assumption, however, cannot 
sustain if there are other factors that can also cause termination of China's original 
contracting party status. 
It is a matter of fact that the General Agreement has not been applied between 
China and any other GATT contracting parties for more than forty years (with respect 
to mainland China, since the founding ofthe PRC in 1949). During this period ofnon- 
application, neither the Chinese government nor any other GATT contracting party 
has ever regarded the General Agreement as applicable, or remaining in force, 
between them,51 albeit each may have relied on different legal grounds.52 
Under the Law ofTreaties, the non-application (or discontinuance in force) of the 
General Agreement between China and other GATT contracting parties may be the 
result of either suspension or termination of the treaty.53 By requesting resumption, 
the PRC government clearly indicates its interpretation of the situation as 
"suspension"5J-should the non-application of GATT be viewed as the result of 
"termination" of the General Agreement between China and other contracting 
parties, accession would be in order. 
Suspension of the operation of a treaty, however, normally requires a clear 
understanding by the parties, evidenced either by consent or by provisions of the 
treaty.55 This principle has also been borne out in the GATT practice. The General 
Agreement contains no provision regarding suspension of the entire Agreement 
between particular contracting parties. Nonetheless, it does contain provisions 
'' Ifany contracting party had considered the General Agreement as "in force" between China and itself, there 
would have been claims on breach oftreaty obligations on either side, since neither has observed the provisions of 
the General Agreement in their mutual relations. In fact, the PRC government did not make any official contact 
with GATT until 1980 and there is no evidence showing that the Chinese government considered itself a GATT 
member during this period. See supra, footnotes 20 and 21 and accompanying text. 
j' While the Chinese government may have believed that its status as a GATT contracting party is an unsettled 
issue, see the PRC's disclaimer in its application for GATT observer status, supra, footnote 22, the GATT contracting 
parties took the 1950 withdrawal by the deposed Chinese government as a valid action. See supra, footnote 15 and 
accompanying text. 
53 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, Part V, 1155 U.N.T.S. 311, defines non- 
application of treaties in three categories: invalidity, termination and suspension of the operation of treaties. 
Invalidity of treaties involves wrong-doing, error or conflict with a peremptory norm ofgeneral international law, 
which is irrelevant to the present situation. 
j' The term of "resumption" is referred to Article 72 of the Vienna Convention, supra, footnote 33, 
Consequences of the suspension of the operation of a treaty: "During the period of the suspension the parties shall 
refrajn from acts tending to obstruct the resumption of the operation of the treaty." 
" Article 57 of the Vienna Convention, supra, footnote 53, provides that suspension may take effect either "in 
conformity with the provisions of the treaty, or by consent of all the parties after consultation . . ." 
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regarding suspension of GATT obligations in respect of particular products under 
specified circumstances, such as suspension of GATT obligations in the case of 
emergency action on imports of particular products (Article XIX) and suspension of 
concessions or other obligations in the case of nullification or impairment (Article 
XXIII:2). In any of such circumstances, the parties affected would have a clear 
understanding of the situation since the consequences of the suspension and the 
procedures to be followed are clearly provided in the General Agreement. In GATT 
history, suspension of an overall application of the General Agreement between 
particular contracting parties occurred once when the CONTRACTING PARTIES 
authorized such suspension between the United States and Czechoslovakia in 1 9 5 1 . ~ ~  
In that case, the suspension and the legal consequences thereof were also clearly 
understood by the parties, as was evidenced by the GATT decision. 
In contrast, the understanding of China's legal status regarding the General 
Agreement appears to be, in retrospect, anything but clear. Apparently there has been 
no mutual consent with respect to China's status. On the part of GATT, the non- 
application of the General Agreement with China has been consistently treated as the 
result of China's withdrawal from the GATT, i.e. termination of the GATT Treaty 
relations with respect to China. On the part of China; the PRC government did not 
clarify its understanding of the situation until it formally requested resumption in July 
1986. Historically, it is well known that the PRC government would not 
automatically succeed to the treaties concluded by former Chinese governments with 
foreign countries; instead, it would make its determination as to whether to 
"recognize, abrogate, revise or renegotiate" each of such treaties according to its 
content.'' While it maintained an unequivocal, positive attitude towards its succession 
of China's membership in the United Nations and various other international 
organizations, the PRC government did not express its interest in GATT until the late 
1970s and its official position regarding its status in GATT remained unknown and 
undefined until its formal request for resumption. 
Furthermore, during the period of non-application of GATT, the PRC 
government entered into separate bilateral trade agreements with most of the GATT 
contracting parties, providing for MFN treatment in their respective bilateral trade 
and other trade-related matters.58 Under the Law ofTreaties, the conclusion of a later 
treaty relating to the same subject-matter of an earlier treaty may terminate the earlier 
one between the same parties, unless it can be established that the parties intended only 
to suspend the operation of the earlier treaty.59 Thus, it is at least arguable that, to the 
54 Declaration of the Contracting Parties on 27 September 1951, 2 BISD 36 (1952). For the context of the 
decision, see Jackson, supra, footnote 6, 749-750. 
" This principle was stipulated in Article 55 of the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference (1949). which served as a quasi constitution of the PRC from 1949 to 1954. See J. Cohen 
and H. Chiu, People's China and International L a w ,  v.11, 1121-1129 (1974); International L a w ,  T. Wang (ed.), 1981, 
121. 
'' China had bilateral trade agreements containing MFN clauses with over ninety countries and regions, as at 
1988, and most of such countries are GATT members. GATT Doc. Spec(88) 13lAdd 4. - 
59 Vienna Convention, supra, footnote 53, Article 59, Termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty 
implied by conclusion of a later treaty. See i n j a ,  text at footnote 72 for quotation of the provision. 
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extent the bilateral trade agreements between China and GATT contracting parties 
relate to the same subject-matter as the General Agreement, the conclusions of such 
later bilateral agreements have the effect of terminating any GATT relations that might 
have existed between them, absent a clear understanding, by express reservation or 
otherwise clear from the context, that the General Agreement was being suspended 
between them. 
The above analysis challenges the assumption underlying the PRC's request for 
resumption. It shows that, independent of the issue of the 1950 withdrawal, it is 
nevertheless uncertain whether China can legally resume its original contracting party 
status. The current non-application of the General Agreement between China and 
GATT contracting parties may not be the result of suspension of GATT applications 
between them. Given the lack of mutual understanding and the conclusion of later 
bilateral trade agreements covering the same subject-matter as the General 
Agreement, the original GATT relations between China and certain other contracting 
parties may have already been terminated as a matter of law.60 
C. Which Treaty is the Right Object of Resumption? 
Even assuming that the GATT relation between China and other contracting 
parties has indeed been suspended rather than terminated, the PRC's resumption 
position is nevertheless flawed for one simple reason: it has confused the General 
Agreement with the PPA as the object of resumption. As already noted above, a most 
peculiar legal aspect of GATT is that the General Agreement itself has never entered 
into force, instead it has been applied under the PPA and a series of accession 
protocols.'" As one of the signatories of the PPA, China once applied the General 
Agreement by and in accordance with the PPA. Logically, any "suspension" of GATT 
relations between China and other contracting parties can only result from suspension 
of the operation of the PPA between them; and any "resumption" of such GATT 
relations can only mean the resumption of the operation of the PPA between them. 
The PPA and subsequent accession protocols are each independent treaties under 
international law." They are registered with the Secretarist of the United Nations in 
accordance with the treaty registration requirement under Article 102 of the U .N .  
Charter.h3 The PPA and the accession protocols set forth specific terms and conditions 
id l There is also the possibility of termination of the GATT Treaty relations as a result of "fundamental change 
of circumstances". See injia, text accompanying footnotes 84-90. 
"' Supra, footnotes 8-10 and accompanying text. 
"' Vienna Convention, supra, footnote 53, Artlcle 2(a), defines "treaty" for its purposes as "an international 
agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a 
single instmment or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation." Technically, 
since the GATT contracting parties are not States but governments acting on behalf of separate customs territories, 
see supra, footnote 49, there is a question whether the Convention applies to their agreements. However, the 
question is rendered insignificant since the Convention also provides that the fact that it does not apply to 
international agreements concluded by subjects of international law other than States shall not affect "the 
dpplication to them of any of  the rules set forth in the present Convention" (Article 3) and that "the present 
Convention applies to any treaty which is the constituent instrument of an internation organization." (Article 5 ) .  
" Article 102(1) of the Charter of the United Nations requires that: "Every treaty and every international 
Agreement entered into by any Member of the United Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall as 
soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat and published by it." U .N.  Charter, Article 102, para. 1. 
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defining the extent to which the General Agreement shall be applied between one 
particular contracting party and others. For example, the PPA provides that its 
contracting parties shall "apply provisionally . . . (a) Parts I and 111 of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and (b) Part I1 of that Agreement to the fullest extent 
not inconsistent with existing l eg i~ l a t i on . "~~  This clause, which has been similarly 
adopted by all subsequent accession protocols, limits the effect ofpart I1 ofthe General 
Agreement and puts the application of the General Agreement on a provisional basis 
indefinitely. Also, certain protocols of accession, particularly those for countries with 
a centrally-planned economy at the time of accession (e.g. Poland, Romania and 
Hungary), contain additional substantive obligations not provided for in the General 
Agreement (e.g. import commitment, quantitative restrictions, selective safeguards 
and periodical reviews).65 To the extent that such additional obligations are 
inconsistent with the General Agreement, these accession protocols modify the 
- 
General Agreement with respect to these countries. Furthermore, the tariff schedule 
of a particular contracting party, which embodies its concrete undertakings under 
GATT, is also annexed to the individual protocol of that party and thereby takes effect 
as an integral part of the General Agreement.M As the former GATT Director-General 
summarized, ". . . the [accession] Protocol is tantamount to a trade agreement which 
sets out the conditions on which the Contracting Parties accept the acceding 
country. "67 
D. The Resumption of the PPA is Impracticable 
While it is theoretically possible to resume the operation of the PPA between 
China and other PPA signatories, it is practically impossible for the PRC government 
to negotiate such a resumption. Over the last four decades, China's economic and 
trade conditions have undergone such a substantial transformation that it is unlikely 
that the contracting parties would agree to let China rejoin GATT by simply resuming 
the operation of the PPA. China's old tariff schedule, which was part of the PPA, is 
totally obsolete; a new schedule reflecting China's contemporary economic and trade 
conditions would have to be negotiated. More importantly, because the PRC has 
established and maintained an economy that is generally perceived as centrally 
planned (on-going economic reforms notwithstanding) and therefore incompatible 
with the GATT system, the contracting parties may demand special provisions 
addressing this concern to be included in the China protocol as they did in the case of 
Poland, Romania and ~ u n ~ a r ~ . "  Although the Chinese government has strongly 
'* 55 U.N.T.S. 308 (1947). 
'j See 15th Supp. BISD 52 (1967); 18th Supp. BISD 10 (1972); 20th Supp. BISD 3 (1974). For a general 
introduction to GATT and centrally-planned economies, see M. M. Kostecki, East- West Trade and the GATT System, 
New York, St. Martin's Press for the Trade Policy Research Center, London, 1979; Jackson, supra, footnote 36, ch. 
13, State Trading and Nonmarket Economies. 
'<, Pursuant to Article II:7 of the General Agreement, the tariff schedules are made an integral part of Part I of 
the General Agreement. 
'17 
(J Long, supra, footnote 18, at 37. See supra, footnote 65 and accompanying text. 
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opposed the imposition of any special discriminatory terms on China," it has 
nevertheless agreed that China's rights and obligations under the General Agreement 
would have to be re-established in the modern context. 
One might ask, however, is it technically possible for China to resume the PPA in 
a revised form or by an amendment thereto? The answer is probably negative. The 
PPA is a multilateral agreement effective since 1948. It would be difficult to revise or  
amend the PPA just to accommodate one of its signatories' changed conditions, as any 
amendment or revision would have to be approved or ratified by each of its 
. . 
contracting parties pursuant to their domestic legal procedures. Furthermore, any 
special provisions regarding China under the PPA would constitute an adhtional 
agreement between China on the one hand andother PPA contracting parties on the 
other. And since the PPA is effective among its own contracting parties only (nineteen 
in total, excluding China7'), any amendment to thePPA would not apply to the 
contracting parties that acceded to GATT after China supposedly suspended its GATT 
relations. 
E. Conclusion of New Protocol Inevitably Terminates the PPA 
Recognizing that a simple resumption of the PPA is impracticable, China and the 
GATT contracting parties have agreed to conclude a new agreement-the China 
Protocol-to define their GATT relations." However, as a matter of law, the 
conclusion of a new agreement governing application of the General Agreement 
between China and other PPA contracting parties would inevitably terminate the PPA 
with respect to China. 
Termination of a treaty may be implied by conclusion of a later treaty with the 
same subject-matter. According to Article 59 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties: 
"1. A treaty shall be considered as terminated if all the parties to it conclude a later treaty 
relating to the same subject-matter and: 
(a) it appears from the later treaty or is otherwise established that the parties intended that the 
matter should be governed by that treaty; or 
(b) the provisions ofthe later treat); are so far incompatible with those of the earlier one that the 
two treaties are not capable of being applied at the same time. 
2. The earlier treaty shall be considered as only suspended in operation if it appears from the 
later treaty or is otherwise established that such was the intention of the parties."7' 
It is obvious that the new agreement between China and the GATT contracting 
01, See supra, footnote 2. 
''I See Attalytical Itrdrx, supra, Protocol-1. See also supra, text at footnote 44 regarding the effect of 
"resumption" on contracting parties that were territories of the PPA signatories and succeeded to GATT under 
Article XXVI:5(c). 
" See supra, text at footnote 26. 
'' Vienna Convention, supra, footnote 53, Article 59. 
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parties would be "relating to the same subject-matter" as that of the PPA-the 
provisional application of the General Agreement-and that all the parties to the new 
agreement would intend the matter of China's GATT application to be governed by the 
new agreement, not the PPA. It also goes without staying that by concluding the new 
agreement, the parties would not wish to keep the PPA suspended in operation with 
respect to China. 
One may question whether the PPA could be deemed terminated with respect to 
China if not "all the parties" to the PPA would enter into the new agreement. Under 
the Law of Treaties, when there are successive treaties relating to the same subject- 
matter and the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the earlier one, 
as between a party to both treaties and a party to only one of the treaties, the treaty to 
which both are parties governs their mutual rights and ~ b l i ~ a t i o n s . ' ~  Theoretically, 
therefore, if an existing PPA contracting party should refuse to enter into the new 
agreement with China, the PPA would remain "suspended" between such party and 
China. In practice, however, since the PPA has not been in use between China and any 
of the PPA contracting parties, it would be inconsequential, as between China and a 
PPA contracting party that would not enter into the new agreement, whether the PPA 
should be deemed as "terminated" or "suspended". 
In sum, the,conclusion of a new protocol on China's application of GATT would 
terminate the PPA with respect to China as a matter of international law. And the 
termination of the PPA with respect to China would render the PRC's "resumption" 
of China's original contracting party status legally impossible. This conclusion will 
stand regardless of whether the new China Protocol should be (mistakenly) entitled 
"the Protocol of resumption". 
As resumption is legally untenable, the best solution for all would be to officially 
terminate China's old status in GATT and proceed with a normal accession in 
accordance with the procedure of Article XXXIII. Evidently, the termination1 
accession approach would eliminate the issues and problems that resumption may 
impose on the particular contracting parties, and avoid all the technical complications 
that may entangle the GATT legal system.'' 
As for the PRC government, a formal termination of China's original 
contracting party status in GATT would be a clear statement that China's withdrawal 
from GATT in 1950 was invalid and that the PRC government alone has the legal 
authority to determine China's application of GATT after 1 October 1949. Such a 
position would be perfectly consistent with the legal principle of the PRC 
government on its succession of treaties, i.e. it shall not automatically succeed to 
treaties concluded by a former Chinese government; instead it shall decide whether to 
73 Vienna Convention, supra, footnote 53, Article 30, para. 4(b) 
See supra, Part 111. 
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recognize, abrogate, revise or re-negotiate each of such treaties according to its 
content.75 
A. The Advantages of Accession for China 
Procedurally, a formal termination of China's old status in GATT would open the 
door for the PRC government to accept an Article XXXIII accession. Accession to 
GATT would provide a number of advantages to China. First of all, pursuing a normal 
accession to GATT would facilitate the negotiation process for China's GATT 
membership. Because the resumption position is legally unsound and may cause legal 
problems for certain contracting parties, the issue may well become a significant 
obstacle in the last stage of the negotiations, in which case, the Chinese government 
may find itself wasting time and resources in defending a position that is both legally 
untenable and politically unnecessary. 
In addition, accession would make the form and substance of China's entry into 
GATT consistent, which wouId enable the PRC government to take legally coherent 
positions on issues concerning its GATT membership. For example, pursuant to 
accession, China would be able to avail itself of the "existing legislation" clause 
without having to resort to legally inconsistent positions.'" 
Furthermore, accepting accession may actually help China to obtain application 
of GATT with the United States, one of the major trading partners of China. As 
discussed above, due to its domestic legal constraints the United States may decide to 
refrain from applying GATT with China, but resumption would techically prevent the 
United States from invoking Article XXXV of the General Agreement for non- 
application.n Since establishing a stabilized MFN relationship with the United States 
is one ofthe major motivations for China tojoin GATT, the possibility that the United 
States may invoke Article XXXV against China naturally causes great concern on the 
part of the PRC government. For both political and economic reasons, the extension 
of China's MFN status by the United States has proven to be increasingly precarious 
and troublesome in recent years. Thus, it has become all the more important for China 
to enter into GATT relations with the United States so that the conditional bilateral 
MFN can be replaced by the GATT unconditional MFN in China-U.S. trade.7" 
However, it has also been realized that resumption cannot effectively prevent 
recourse to non-application of GATT.~' That being the case, resumption can only 
complicate the legal process without yielding any practical results on this issue. In 
contrast, by accepting accession, the Chinese government would be able to take 
advantage ofthe U.S. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 which makes 
it legally possible for the United States to enter into GATT relations with China. 
75 See supra, footnote 57 ~ n d  accompanying text. 
76 See supra, Part 111. 2. 
77 See supra, footnotes 35 to 37 and accompanying text. 
7n See supra, footnote 37 on China's current MFN status in the United States. See Cai, supra, footnote 5 ,  at 
44-46. 
'" Li, sirpra, footnote 4, at 45; Cai, ibid., at 46-47. 
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Pursuant to the 1988 Act, the United States may consent to the accession of a major 
non-market economy country to GATT ifsuch country enters into agreement with the 
United States restricting its State trading activities or if the U.S. Congress specifically 
approves the application of GATT to such country.80 Technically speaking, because the 
Act refers to accession only, China would not be able to utilize this procedure unless it 
accepts accession as the legal form of its entry into GATT. 
Finally, since Article XXXV may be invoked by the acceding country as well as 
the existing contracting parties, accession would also avail China of its right to invoke 
Article XXXV against any existing contracting party with which it may not wish to 
enter into GATT relations immediately. 
B. Methods of Terminating the PPA 
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties, a treaty may be terminated 
on one of the following grounds: 
(1) in accordance with the provisions of the treaty (Article 54(a)); 
(2) by consent of the parties (Article 54(b)); 
(3) by conclusion of a later treaty (Article 59); 
(4) as a consequence of its breach (Article 60); 
(5) supervening impossibility impossibility of performance, if the impossiblity 
rksults from permanent disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable 
for the execution of the treaty (Article 61); 
(6) fundamental change of circumstances (Article 62); or 
(7) in conflict with a new peremptory norm of general international law (Article 
64). 
Thus, in addition to termination by the conclusion of a new agreement discussed 
above, the PPA may be terminated with respect to China by one of the following 
methods: 
(1) Withdrawal from the PPA 
The PRC government's request for resumption of China's status as a contracting 
RI See Title I of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Sec. 1106, Pub. L. 100-418, 102 Stat. 
1133. Section 1106, Accession of State Trading Regimes to the General Agreement on Tari/fs and Trade, essentially 
provides that, before any major country accedes to GATT, the U.S. President must determine whether State 
trading enterprises account for a significant share ofits trade with the United States and whether such State trading 
enterprises unduly burden the economy and trade ofthe United States. Ifso, the United States may apply GATT to 
such country only if: (1) the country enters into an agreement with the United States providing that State trading 
enterprises will act in accordance with commercial considerations; or (2) Congress approves the application of 
GATT to such country by enacting law under specified procedures. It should be noted that the Act was enacted after 
the negotiation had begun on China's contracting party status in GATT 
" Vienna Convention, supra, footnote 53. For termination of treaties, see generally, A. McNair. Law of 
Treaties, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961; 14 Whiteman, supra, footnote 46, Secs. 36-38; A. Vamvoukos, 
Termination of Treaties in International L a w ,  Oxford, Clarendon Press, New York, Oxford University Press, 1985; 
R. Plender, T h e  Role of Consent in the Termination of Treaties, 1986 Brit. Y. B. Int'l L. 132; B. Simma, Termination and 
Suspension of'Treaties, 1978 Germ. Y. B. Int'l L. 74; Q. Wright, T h e  Termination andSuspensiot~ of Treaties, 61 Am. J .  
Int'l L. 1000, 1967. 
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party to GATT indicates that it recognizes the validity of the PPA and considers China 
still a party to the PPA. Based on this assumption, the PRC government could decide 
to exercise its right to withdraw from the PPA in accordance with Article 5 thereof, 
which provides: 
"Any government applying this Protocol shall be free to withdraw such appiication, and such 
withdrawal shall take effect upon the expiration of sixty days from the day on which written 
notice of such withdrawal is received by the Secretary-General of the United ~ations."" 
In its written notice, the PRC government could advise that its decision to 
withdraw is based on the assessment that the resumption of the PPA is no longer 
adequate in view of the substantial changes that have occurred during the period of 
suspension. A formal act ofwithdrawal from the PPA by the PRC government would 
procedurally clear the way for its accession to GATT, with the effect of reaffirming its 
position on the invalidity of the 1950 withdrawal. 
(2) Express mutual consent 
The termination of a treaty may take place at any time by consent of all the 
parties. The power of the parties to terminate a treaty by mutual consent whenever 
they wish to do so is incontestable, and such power could not be denied without 
denying the right of States to enter into treatie~.'~ Undoubtedly, China and other 
original contracting parties could terminate the PPA between them at any time 
through their mutual consent. A simple statement to this effect, either by a joint 
declaration or incorporated in China's accession protocol, would be sufficient for this 
purpose. 
(3) Fundamental change of circumstances 
International law has long recognized fundamental change of circumstances as a 
valid ground for termination of a treaty (rebus sic s t a n t i b ~ s ) . ~ ~  In contrast with 
termination by consent of the parties, termination of a treaty on the ground of 
fundamental change of circumstances is by operation of la^.^^ The doctrine is codified 
under Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 
"A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing at 
the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be 
invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless: 
" 55 U.N.T.S. 308 (1947). 
'' Harvard Research Draft Convention on the Law ofTreaties, with Comment, 29 (Supp. 2) Am. J. Int'l L. 
1163, 1935. 
w See 0. Lissitzyn, Treaties and Changed Circumstances, 61 Am. J .  Int'l L. 895, 1967; G. Haraszti, Treaties and 
the Fundamental Change oj~Circumstatzces, 1461111 Recueil des Cours d'hcademie de Droit International 7, 1975; 
Vamvoukos, supra, footnote 81, Part I. 
H5 Haraszti, ibid., at 8. Because the doctrine is usually invoked by one or more parties of the treaty against 
another party or parties of the treaty, it is not uncommon that invocation of the doctrine has given rise to 
international disputes. See Vamvoukos, supra, footnote 81: 61-124 for State practice with respect to invocations of 
the doctrine; 152-185 for invocations of the doctrine in adjudications and pleadings. 
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(a) the existence o f  those circumstances constituted an essential basis o f  the consent o f  the 
parties to  be bound b y  the treaty; and 
(b) the effect of  the change is radically t o  transform the extent  o f  obligations still to  be 
performed under the treaty."" 
In the light ofthese provisions, other PPA contracting parties could claim that the 
substantial changes that have occurred during the non-application of GATT to China 
constitute "a fundamental change of circumstances . . . unforeseen" at the time of the 
conclusion of the PPA, and the occurrence of such a change warrants the termination 
of the PPA with respect to China." Arguably, both conditions provided in Article 62 
have been met in the present case. First, there is no question that the substantial 
changes during the last forty years have the effect to "radically transform" the extent 
of the GATT obligations originally undertaken by China vis-d-vis other contracting 
parties under the PPA. As the PRC government has acknowledged, as a result of the 
considerable changes that have taken place during those years, rights and obligations 
must be re-set regarding the application O ~ G A T T  between China and other contracting 
parties.88 Secondly, given that the General Agreement is premised upon the institution 
of market economy, the contracting parties could argue that the existence of a market 
economy in China was "an essential basis" of their consent to establishing GATT 
relations with China in 1948, and that China's subsequent adoption of a centrally 
planned economy fundamentally changed such basis oftheir consent.89 Thus, at least 
in theory, the contracting parties could claim "a fundamental change of 
circumstances" as the ground for terminating their application of the PPA with 
China," and reject the resumption request of the PRC government accordingly. 
MI The doctrine is an exception to the basic doctrine of the law oftreaties, pacta sunt servanda, which is codified 
by Article 26 ofthe Vienna Convention as follows: "Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must 
be performed by them in good faith." The restrictive language ofAiticle 62 reflects the traditional view, shared by 
the International Law Commission ofthe United Nations (the drafter ofthe Vienna Convention), that the doctrine 
of rebus sic stantibus should be applied in exceptional cases only and the conditions under which it may be invoked 
should be strictly regulated. As the circumstances are always changing, international legal relations would become 
hopelessly insecure ifa State could releaseitselffrom its treaty obligations at will. See 14 Whitexnan, supra, footnote 
46, Sec. 40, Effect of Changed Conditions, at 480. 
n7 The application of Article 62 in this case should not cause concern over the strict construction policy of the 
Article, supra, footnote 86, since the treaty in question has not been in use with respect to China for most of its term 
and its termination will not upset the existing treaty relations. 
8') 
See supra, text at footnote 28. 
In GATT history, two original contracting parties, Czechoslovakia and Cuba, also radically changed their 
market economy into centrally-planned economies afterjoining GATT. AS a result, the United States suspended its 
GATT application with Czechoslovakia in 1951. See supra. footnotes 36 and 56. Although other original contracting 
parties maintained their formal GATT relations with Czechoslovakia and Cuba thereafter, thanks to the reciprocal 
nature of GATT obligations, many were able to suspend de facto their application of GATT with the two countries 
without having to resort to formal termination or suspension of the PPA. See Kostecki, supra. footnote 65, at 
23-35; Ya Qin, China and G A T T :  Toward a iMeanindu1 Participation? in A Study oJLegal Issues Concerning China's 
Entry into the General Agreement on Tar$ and Trade, 298, 1990 (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation. Harvard 
University Law School, available in Harvard Law School Library). The incompatibility of the centrally-planned 
economy with the GATT regime has also been proven by GATT's unsuccessful efforts to incorporate centrally- 
planned economies as such into the GATT system. See Qin, id., at.34-39. 
'MI In accordance with Articles 65 and 67 ofthe Vienna Convention, supra, footnote 53, a party which invokes a 
ground for terminating a treaty must notify the other parties of its claim in writing. If no other party raises 
objection within a period ofno less than three months after the receipt ofthe notification, the termination will take 
effect through an instrument communicated to the otherparties. Ifobjection has been raised by any other party, the 
matter shall be resolved pursuant to the procedure of dispute settlement provided for by the Convention. 
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Of these three possible ways of termination, a formal withdrawal or express 
mutual consent is clearly preferable for the PRC government, since either of the two 
methods would afford the PRC government with an opportunity to formally consent 
to the termination and affirm its legal position regarding the 1950 withdrawal. 
Although in this case there is no reason why the termination cannot be realized 
through consent, it should be recognized that, as a matter of international law, other 
PPA contracting parties do have a claim of unilateral termination on the ground of a 
fundamental change of circumstances. Recognition of this potential claim should also 
motivate China to take the initiative in terminating the PPA. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The PRC government's request for resumption of China's original contracting 
party status in GATT is essentially a request for accession in the name of resumption. 
From the PRCgovernment's perspective, itis a matter ofprinciple to declare the 1950 
withdrawal from GATT by a deposed Chinese government null and void in 
international law, and the PRC government must claim its right to resume China's 
original contracting party status and, despite the substantive terms of such status, it 
should be re-set in the modem context. 
In taking this resumption position, the PRC government appears to have 
confused the question of government representation with the question of treaty 
application, and mistaken the General Agreement for the 1947 Protocol ofProvisiona1 
Application as the object of "resumption." 
China's membership in GATT is not a question ofgovernment representation, but 
a question of treaty application. In so far as GATT is concerned, the question of which 
government has represented China since 1949 has long been settled. Therefore, the 
validity of the 1950 withdrawal is not the real issue. What is at issue is the continuing 
validity of China's original contracting party status. The validity of such status has 
been brought into question by the non-application of GATT between China and other 
GATT contracting parties for a period of more than forty years-a period equal to the 
entire life of the PRC-and the substantial changes that have taken place during this 
period of non-application. The answer to this question can only be found in the Law 
of Treaties. 
The PRC government's resumption position is ultimately untenable under the 
Law of Treaties k a u s e  it has overlooked the unique legal structure of GATT and 
mistaken the General Agreement itself as the object of resumption. For historical 
reasons, fhe General Agreement has never entered into force. Instead, GATT 
contracting parties concluded the 1947 Protocol of Provisional Application and a 
series of accession protocols to effect the application of the General Agreement. 
Under this legal structure, it is the PPA and accession protocols that are treaties 
effective among the GATT contracting parties. Since China became an original 
contracting party to GATT by being a contracting party to the PPA, the resumption of 
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China's original contracting party status in GATT can only mean the resumption of the 
operation of the PPA with respect to China. However, due to the substantial changes 
that have taken place during the period of non-application of GATT between them, 
China and GATT contracting parties have agreed to conclude a new Chma Protocol to 
redefine their respective rights and obligations under GATT. In accordance with the 
Law of Treaties, however, the conclusion of such a new protocol would terminate the 
PPA with respect to China, thereby rendering the resumption groundless. This result 
would occur regardless of whether the parties so acknowledge. 
In view of the inevitability of the PPA's termination with respect to China, it is 
recommended that the Chinese government take the initiative in announcing such 
termination and proceed with a normal accession to GATT. Since the question of 
government representation-the chief concern underlying the PRC's resumption 
position-turns out to be irrelevant in determining of China's current status in GATT, 
there appears to be no policy reason for the PRC government to insist on the 
resumption approach. Once the legal myth is solved, the PRC government should 
feel free to pursue its accession under Article XXXIII of the General Agreement. A 
simple accession would not only avoid generating unnecessary complications and 
incoherence for the GATT legal system, but also help to strengthen China's negotiation 
position and facilitate the negotiation process on its membership. 
A self-initiated termination of the PPA would procedurally clear the way for 
China to pursue an accession to GATT. This can be achieved either through a formal 
withdrawal of the PRC government from the PPA, or by a statement in connection 
with the China protocol expressing the mutual consent of China and other PPA 
contracting parties to the effect of such termination. 
This issue of resumption v. accession, albeit perceived by many as a matter of 
mere procedural formality, may have an encumbering effect on the GATT legal 
system. While GATT might be flexible enough to accommodate China's request 
despite the fallacy of the resumption, such accommodation would have to be made at 
the expense of due respect for law, an expense that is neither necessary nor 
unavoidable as demonstrated by the above analysis. 
